According to Mill, the greatest objection to the Utilitarian or Happiness Theory is the idea of justice. Many argue that if it is moral to achieve personal happiness or common (public) happiness, justice can play no part, as justice considers personal liberty, property or anything granted by law as is most applicable to society above the interests of personal happiness.
Everyone seems to agree that justice is necessary in most, although not all, areas of life. Justice is not something that can be excluded.
Justice works to promote good for everyone. But happiness would seem to promote only one person: the individual experiencing the happiness. Although, this does not take into consideration the idea of sympathy, which states that we feel what others feel.
Mill accepts this argument as a valid one, however, he says that it demonstrates a lack of understanding of the happiness theory itself.
But happiness is found in justice, as justice is defined by the common good, regardless of individual happiness. How can there really be such a thing as individual happiness with the acceptance of the idea of sympathy?
I believe it is this definition (that happiness in not individual but of the public, as each man experiences his neighbor’s emotion) that gives support to Mill’s Happiness Theory. Because happiness is the common good, just as justice is for the public benefit, the argument against the Utilitarian Theory based on inconsistency between the theory and justice is a null argument, void of true validity.

Mill’s Utilitarianism, chapters 1 and 2 are used to explain the most basic definition of utilitarianism. Chapter 1 presents his opening remarks; his second chapter works toward giving greater detail for the points made in the opening section.
Mill’s intention in writing this book was to explain the Utilitarian or Happiness Theory. It is Mill’s opinion that the Happiness Theory can be used as a test of right and wrong (morality). Mill makes the following arguments in support of this idea. Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle…the ultimate end…is an existence exempt as far as possible pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments…
…the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.
…happiness is a good: that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria or morality.
Through these arguments, Mill did a good job of explaining the utilitarian, or happiness, theory and in supporting his opinions against those of his objectors.
It is my understanding that the happiness theory, on its most basic level, says that mankind works to achieve happiness for self and others, and that it is those actions taken to achieve this happiness that are considered moral. It is also important to understand that while the ultimate happiness may not be achievable (as pointed out by those who disagree with the theory), it is the act of working toward this good that finds people behaving morally.

Mill makes the point that “A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertaining it.” I found this to be an interesting comment.

Most people dislike pain and prefer pleasure or happiness.
The happiness of one is, in at least most cases, contingent on the happiness of others. We have already in this class established the fact that everyone, short of sociopaths and psychopaths, experiences sympathy. When others feel pain or pleasure, you feel pain or pleasure.
I should think it would be safe to make the assumption that any individual would say that if he himself were caused pain, the action taken against him would have been an immoral one.
There are few people (again, only sociopaths, psychopaths and masochists) that enjoy experiencing or inflicting pain without remorse. While we can argue that the immorality of pain as defined by others applies to these as well, we must also acknowledge that people who fall into these three categories may disagree with the definition.
Excluding the opinions of these abnormal groups, the majority of mankind would agree, given the support provided, that to cause pain or sorrow to another is immoral. If causing someone else pain or sorrow results in experiencing that same pain or sorrow yourself (sympathy), and having someone inflict pain or sorrow on you is immoral, it would only make sense that causing unhappiness to another is immoral.

O’Neill compares her writing to that of Kant in that she addresses the obligations experienced by one that allow another to define something as his right. This is very similar to the approach Kant took when writing the Metaphysics of Morals. This also differs considerably from the Rights Theory which considers rights, not obligations, as the basis of its arguments.
O’Neill’s argument begins with the idea that there are significant differences between the theories that claim that rights are fundamental and those that claim that obligations are fundamental. She then points out some of the ways in which an account of obligation based on the constructivist is more advantageous than an account of right. She further argued that when speaking in the context of issues regarding children, the approach that rights are fundamental contains some distinct political costs. Her conclusion, based on these arguments, seems to be that the appropriate approach to take with children in ethical issues would be that of obligations as fundamentals as rights as fundamentals proves to be neither theoretical nor political advantageous.
I think a fair argument would be that there is such a difference between rights and obligations that they are two separate arguments and not just opposite ends of the same argument. By this I mean that the question of someone’s rights is not contingent on another’s obligations. For example, my rights to free speech are affected by, but not based on, another’s obligations to listen to, or to consider, my expressed opinions. Simply because someone refuses to give my views appropriate consideration does not mean that I then lose my rights to express those views.

For the most part I found this section of Kant’s writing to be more enjoyable as well as more understandable. His discussion of “duties” in each of the contexts he uses make the distinctions very clearly. I especially appreciated the explanation of a man’s duty to himself. Kant’s point that the idea of duty to oneself involves a contradiction was a point I myself would have raised had he not addressed it first.
I had a bit of difficulty with the concept of “defiling oneself by lust.” Kant made a point about couples who are at the time pregnant or incapable of procreating and their inability or lack of desire to work toward procreation that I found rather confusing.
When Kant talked about a man’s “duty to himself as his own innate judge,” I was able to understand his explanation that there is as a result of being one’s own judge, no actual duty in this situation as a man’s obligations to himself become no obligation at all.
Kant’s discussions of respect was also clear, as were his explanations of arrogance, and ridicule. However, I found defamation to be more complex and had difficulties comprehending.
I especially enjoyed the section on friendship.

I do not really understand the concept of “a priori.”
I particularly enjoyed Paragraph 8 on page 44 about having something external as one’s own only in a civil condition, however the next paragraph on possession provisionally was confusing.
I really did not understand the idea behind Section II’s paragraph 19 on page 57.
Section III on “rights to persons akin to rights to things” was particularly interesting.
I found Kant’s discussion of contracts to be rather repetitious. In fact, the majority of the second section of Part I seemed needlessly repetitious as it defined each form of contract, all of which are at their simplest levels more or less defined by the same means.
Part II, which addressed the ideas of the public right, I found extremely difficult to read as it was composed significantly of definitions which are pretty well known. The discussion of these concepts, many of which I already understood, eventually led me to discontinue reading this part of Kant’s work and move on to the next part.

When someone contradicts himself, it seems to indicate that he does not believe what he is saying and thus paid little mind to the arguments he has made, that he does not understand the situation at all and is merely speaking to feel productive, or that he is simply lying and has been caught in this deception. If any of these situations prove to be the case, the immorality of contradiction is rather obvious. In order to explain, allow me to address each situation separately.
In the first, the immorality is in the man’s willingness to engage his neighbor in an argument in which he has no real interest. To debate something because you feel passionate about it is admirable, while to argue an issue of which you have no concern makes you appear a rather spiteful and unkind person.
For the second, immorality can be applied to the idea of involving yourself in an argument in which you have no understanding. In this situation, your need to be heard implies that you are desperate for attention and lack self-worth enough to be secure in your knowledge or lack thereof. The attempt to valid yourself by becoming involved in a discussion of which you know nothing does nothing to encourage people to think highly of you: in fact, the exact opposite. It is likely to cause people to think less of you and to avoid situations where you might be able to make a greater fool of yourself.
The final scenario presented is the most obvious. Immorality abounds when you intentionally mislead another.
I believe these examples make it rather easy to determine a correct moral code in regards to contradiction and its avoidance: always avoid lying, and if you do not have the necessary intelligence or passion for the argument, excuse yourself from it.

Hume raises many significant arguments in this second half of his book. He addresses the idea that virtues are useful as they are the most desired description of a man. He says that every man desires to be described as virtuous because virtue is the greatest compliment afforded man. He then explains why it is that usefulness (utility) causes pleasure. Hume says that when something proves useful, it gives direct benefit to the person describing it as useful, and it is from this application to self (self love) that the pleasure arises.
In the next section, Hume discusses the “qualities useful to ourselves.” He makes the point that it is less about the quality in question and more about the degree of the quality, as “no quality…is absolutely either blameable or praise-worthy.” He explains this point using different qualities.
Continuing in his discussion of agreeable qualities, Hume then presents qualities which he claims are immediately agreeable. He uses cheerfulness as an example, but also discusses dangerousness as the reverse: an immediately disagreeable quality. Courage and tranquility are two more examples he uses. I found his arguments here to be particularly convincing.
Section 8 discussed a few of the qualities that others immediately find agreeable. Ingenuity, good manners and politeness, and decency provided support for his arguments here. I had a bit of difficulty understanding exactly how Hume distinguished between the qualities immediately agreeable and immediately agreeable to others. I am not sure I understand well enough to be able to distinguish should I be handed a list and asked to sort them into their separate categories.

In the first chapter, Hume addresses the importance of philosophy in being the foundation and the reason for discussions of principles. Hume says that it is necessary to understand what it is that you are arguing for, but to also be willing to listen to other arguments and consider them justly.
He then moves into a discussion of morals and that which we base them on. He says that some may argue that morals are based on reason, whereas others would state that morals are based on sentiment, based on emotion and virtue, which is itself based on amiability. But “render men totally indifferent towards these distinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions.” (pg 75, 7)
From this comes the talk of benevolence and the natural virtues. Hume makes the argument that the greatest compliment one can be given is to be credited with being a virtuous person. To behave sympathetically is to live a good life and to be respected.
Hume once again raises the discussion of justice, which he says is relative to the situation. He talks about the idea theocracy, one in which everyone and everything would work to promote the public good which would ideally lead to universal equality, but also states that this equality, while wonderful sounding, is completely impractical. This slips right into the discussion of property and its distribution.
The final section for today’s readings covered the discussion of political society. This goes back to justice and the ways in which men make decisions, whether for personal gain or public good. Hume also talks of chastity, with an emphasis on its relevance for women more significantly than for men. I must admit, I found this somewhat out of place, which may be because of confusion about the transitioning argument. Hume ended this section by addressing the idea that rules dictate every action, even those that goes against social norms (including, but not limited to, murder).