In the play, Doubt, the writer is making the point that doubt plays a significant role in our lives. Too often, doubt is present where certainty would be ideal. The writer speaks of doubt with what almost seems to be a sense of awe. “Doubt requires more courage than conviction does, and more energy; because conviction is a resting place and doubt is infinite – it is a passionate exercise.” (preface, page 7)
It is, of course, the intention of the play to create a feeling of sympathy toward Father Flynn, at least in the beginning. I found myself sympathetic toward Flynn throughout, despite the accusations that he formed an inappropriate relationship with the child. At no point did I find myself believing the accusations might be true.
For this reason, I also found Flynn to be admirable. Oddly enough, I found Sister James to be rather admirable as well. While she fumbled in the beginning, trying to decide how she felt toward both Father Flynn and Sister Aloysius, she behaved as she saw fit. She followed orders despite feeling that she was behaving unjustly; that is, without truly understanding the situation. This is admirable, to an extent. By the end of the play, Sister James was willing to stand for her belief that Flynn was innocent. This is even more admirable than her initial behaviors.
Because of the differences in ideas regarding the proper relationship between the ministers and those ministered, the ways in which Sister Aloysius and Father Flynn interact and view interacts would be very different. This is important to understanding why it is that Sister Aloysius beliefs what she does about Flynn, and why she makes the claims about him. Despite the suggestions that Sister Aloysius makes these claims merely because of her disdain for Flynn, it is possible to look at their differences of opinions and attribute her accusations simply to a different understanding of the roles they fill.
To borrow the quote provided in our syllabus, “Doubt is not the opposite of faith; it is one element of faith.” Dynamics of Faith

Nov 7th

Thomson’s article spends his time pointing out flaws in the arguments of his opposition. He argues that the woman should not be expected to carry the child if it would put her life at risk. He also says that a person has the right to avoid being killed, but only when it does not cause harm to the person who would be doing the killing. Marquis makes many of the same arguments. They support the idea that a fetus has the right to live assuming that the mother is not at risk as a result.
In opposition, Feinberg supports the reverse of the above theories. Feinberg says that because a baby is born little brighter than a vegetable, unable to make decisions for itself, it has no rights. According to Feinberg, until a child is able to make rational decisions, it has no claim to rights.
I really found all of these readings to be hard to get through. They spend a lot of time making points that were not their own. I would have found it easier if they had led with their own opinions and not those of their opponents.

I believe that fetuses do in fact have a right to life in most situations.
Allow me to explain. These situations include all but those in which the mother‘s life is at stake. If the question is who should live, the child or the mother, I believe the mother should be considered first. I do not think she should be asked to forfeit her own life for her child’s. This brings about too many factors: at least one motherless child, possible a widower, and the loss of a life that has had time to live and become something.
That having been said, here are my supports for my opinion.
I was raised to believe that no innocent life should be taken. An unborn child is most certainly an innocent life. One might argue, is a fetus a living being? Yes, in fact, I think that as soon as it has developed a heartbeat, it is a living being.
As for whether this living being has rights, I would be inclined to say in general no, but in this regard, yes. I do not believe a fetus has many rights, in fact, I might say the right to life is the only.
I would think this would clearly express a belief in the fetus thus having a right to not be aborted, as it has a right to life. Now, some people argue that the fetus’ rights should not negate the mother’s rights (ie the right to abort), however, I am of the opinion that the fetus’ rights should in fact negate those of the mother assuming she wants to abort for reasons other than personal safety. If, for example, the woman is pregnant due to lack of, or incorrect use of, contraception, I certainly would argue that she knowingly put herself into this situation, and therefore must face the consequences.
People will also argue the rape issue: should she be allowed an abortion if she conceived as a result of rape? I would say no.
Now, I would like to explain that these are my personal opinions at the present moment as they could be applied to my own life. Should I ever find myself, or someone I care about strongly, faced with these difficult issues, it is entirely possible that I would change my opinion.

For Mon Nov 3

The question of the day concerns the definition of keeping promises as a possible social construct.
I think the obvious answer is yes, we likely did, as a society, decide that it would be right, and to the benefit of society as a whole, to have our promises kept.
Once again, I want to use the concept of sympathy in my explanation.
Most actions are performed based on contracts: I will do something to benefit you, as long as you agree to do something to benefit me. For significant actions, ones that are seen as being of great importance to one or both of the parties involved, written contracts are generally used. However, in some cases, written contracts are impossible or unnecessary and verbal contracts are enough.
It was this need for verbal contracts that led to the establishment of promises as a basis for expectation. And it is this basis of expectation that allows for the keeping of promises to be considered “right” and the breaking “wrong.” Because one expects the other to hold up his end of the deal, so to speak, when the promise is kept, the result is a feeling of pleasure at having been granted the desired benefits agreed upon and promised. When one experiences this feeling of pleasure, the other can often experience a sympathy resulting in his own feeling of pleasure. It is this shared happiness that encourages each party to do as promised.
While no other right is necessarily depending on that of having our promises kept, and neither is having our promises kept necessarily dependent on any other rights, we find that this pleasure as described previously is dependent on honored verbal contracts. Thus, it could be said that our right to happiness is somewhat dependent on our ability and willingness to keep our promises, which would in turn encourage others to keep their promises.

For Friday Oct 29th

Utilitarianism puts a great deal of focus on the happiness of the individual. It says that each person is entitled to work toward his own personal gain, and that in doing so, he will actually promote the gain of the group as a whole.
One possible flaw with this argument, at least according to those who disagree with Mill, might be the possibility that what might be in an individual’s best interest could conflict with the common good and could possibly result in actual harm to those affected by the individual’s behavior.
Another possible flaw, Mill presents as an issue of conflicting religious views. While one religion finds it perfectly acceptable to, for example, eat pork, another religion might find it to be not merely disrespectful but outright blasphemous.
I think these are both valid arguments, even considering Mill’s attempts to respond. I really had difficulty understanding the way Mill tried to argue against his opponents and in support of his own theories.
As far as the differing levels of acceptance of Mill’s writings from one country to another, I think it might be easier for Americans to accept the idea of individual flaws because of Americans’ inclination to view behaviors as being inherently individual. Other nations consider society to be more encompassing of the whole, with much less focus on individualism. Because this is the most basic component of Mill’s Utilitarianism, it would make sense that the British, among those of other nationalities, would disagree because of their definitions of their own cultures.

According to Mill, the greatest objection to the Utilitarian or Happiness Theory is the idea of justice. Many argue that if it is moral to achieve personal happiness or common (public) happiness, justice can play no part, as justice considers personal liberty, property or anything granted by law as is most applicable to society above the interests of personal happiness.
Everyone seems to agree that justice is necessary in most, although not all, areas of life. Justice is not something that can be excluded.
Justice works to promote good for everyone. But happiness would seem to promote only one person: the individual experiencing the happiness. Although, this does not take into consideration the idea of sympathy, which states that we feel what others feel.
Mill accepts this argument as a valid one, however, he says that it demonstrates a lack of understanding of the happiness theory itself.
But happiness is found in justice, as justice is defined by the common good, regardless of individual happiness. How can there really be such a thing as individual happiness with the acceptance of the idea of sympathy?
I believe it is this definition (that happiness in not individual but of the public, as each man experiences his neighbor’s emotion) that gives support to Mill’s Happiness Theory. Because happiness is the common good, just as justice is for the public benefit, the argument against the Utilitarian Theory based on inconsistency between the theory and justice is a null argument, void of true validity.

Mill’s Utilitarianism, chapters 1 and 2 are used to explain the most basic definition of utilitarianism. Chapter 1 presents his opening remarks; his second chapter works toward giving greater detail for the points made in the opening section.
Mill’s intention in writing this book was to explain the Utilitarian or Happiness Theory. It is Mill’s opinion that the Happiness Theory can be used as a test of right and wrong (morality). Mill makes the following arguments in support of this idea. Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle…the ultimate end…is an existence exempt as far as possible pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments…
…the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.
…happiness is a good: that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria or morality.
Through these arguments, Mill did a good job of explaining the utilitarian, or happiness, theory and in supporting his opinions against those of his objectors.
It is my understanding that the happiness theory, on its most basic level, says that mankind works to achieve happiness for self and others, and that it is those actions taken to achieve this happiness that are considered moral. It is also important to understand that while the ultimate happiness may not be achievable (as pointed out by those who disagree with the theory), it is the act of working toward this good that finds people behaving morally.

Mill makes the point that “A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertaining it.” I found this to be an interesting comment.

Most people dislike pain and prefer pleasure or happiness.
The happiness of one is, in at least most cases, contingent on the happiness of others. We have already in this class established the fact that everyone, short of sociopaths and psychopaths, experiences sympathy. When others feel pain or pleasure, you feel pain or pleasure.
I should think it would be safe to make the assumption that any individual would say that if he himself were caused pain, the action taken against him would have been an immoral one.
There are few people (again, only sociopaths, psychopaths and masochists) that enjoy experiencing or inflicting pain without remorse. While we can argue that the immorality of pain as defined by others applies to these as well, we must also acknowledge that people who fall into these three categories may disagree with the definition.
Excluding the opinions of these abnormal groups, the majority of mankind would agree, given the support provided, that to cause pain or sorrow to another is immoral. If causing someone else pain or sorrow results in experiencing that same pain or sorrow yourself (sympathy), and having someone inflict pain or sorrow on you is immoral, it would only make sense that causing unhappiness to another is immoral.

O’Neill compares her writing to that of Kant in that she addresses the obligations experienced by one that allow another to define something as his right. This is very similar to the approach Kant took when writing the Metaphysics of Morals. This also differs considerably from the Rights Theory which considers rights, not obligations, as the basis of its arguments.
O’Neill’s argument begins with the idea that there are significant differences between the theories that claim that rights are fundamental and those that claim that obligations are fundamental. She then points out some of the ways in which an account of obligation based on the constructivist is more advantageous than an account of right. She further argued that when speaking in the context of issues regarding children, the approach that rights are fundamental contains some distinct political costs. Her conclusion, based on these arguments, seems to be that the appropriate approach to take with children in ethical issues would be that of obligations as fundamentals as rights as fundamentals proves to be neither theoretical nor political advantageous.
I think a fair argument would be that there is such a difference between rights and obligations that they are two separate arguments and not just opposite ends of the same argument. By this I mean that the question of someone’s rights is not contingent on another’s obligations. For example, my rights to free speech are affected by, but not based on, another’s obligations to listen to, or to consider, my expressed opinions. Simply because someone refuses to give my views appropriate consideration does not mean that I then lose my rights to express those views.

For the most part I found this section of Kant’s writing to be more enjoyable as well as more understandable. His discussion of “duties” in each of the contexts he uses make the distinctions very clearly. I especially appreciated the explanation of a man’s duty to himself. Kant’s point that the idea of duty to oneself involves a contradiction was a point I myself would have raised had he not addressed it first.
I had a bit of difficulty with the concept of “defiling oneself by lust.” Kant made a point about couples who are at the time pregnant or incapable of procreating and their inability or lack of desire to work toward procreation that I found rather confusing.
When Kant talked about a man’s “duty to himself as his own innate judge,” I was able to understand his explanation that there is as a result of being one’s own judge, no actual duty in this situation as a man’s obligations to himself become no obligation at all.
Kant’s discussions of respect was also clear, as were his explanations of arrogance, and ridicule. However, I found defamation to be more complex and had difficulties comprehending.
I especially enjoyed the section on friendship.

I do not really understand the concept of “a priori.”
I particularly enjoyed Paragraph 8 on page 44 about having something external as one’s own only in a civil condition, however the next paragraph on possession provisionally was confusing.
I really did not understand the idea behind Section II’s paragraph 19 on page 57.
Section III on “rights to persons akin to rights to things” was particularly interesting.
I found Kant’s discussion of contracts to be rather repetitious. In fact, the majority of the second section of Part I seemed needlessly repetitious as it defined each form of contract, all of which are at their simplest levels more or less defined by the same means.
Part II, which addressed the ideas of the public right, I found extremely difficult to read as it was composed significantly of definitions which are pretty well known. The discussion of these concepts, many of which I already understood, eventually led me to discontinue reading this part of Kant’s work and move on to the next part.

When someone contradicts himself, it seems to indicate that he does not believe what he is saying and thus paid little mind to the arguments he has made, that he does not understand the situation at all and is merely speaking to feel productive, or that he is simply lying and has been caught in this deception. If any of these situations prove to be the case, the immorality of contradiction is rather obvious. In order to explain, allow me to address each situation separately.
In the first, the immorality is in the man’s willingness to engage his neighbor in an argument in which he has no real interest. To debate something because you feel passionate about it is admirable, while to argue an issue of which you have no concern makes you appear a rather spiteful and unkind person.
For the second, immorality can be applied to the idea of involving yourself in an argument in which you have no understanding. In this situation, your need to be heard implies that you are desperate for attention and lack self-worth enough to be secure in your knowledge or lack thereof. The attempt to valid yourself by becoming involved in a discussion of which you know nothing does nothing to encourage people to think highly of you: in fact, the exact opposite. It is likely to cause people to think less of you and to avoid situations where you might be able to make a greater fool of yourself.
The final scenario presented is the most obvious. Immorality abounds when you intentionally mislead another.
I believe these examples make it rather easy to determine a correct moral code in regards to contradiction and its avoidance: always avoid lying, and if you do not have the necessary intelligence or passion for the argument, excuse yourself from it.

Hume raises many significant arguments in this second half of his book. He addresses the idea that virtues are useful as they are the most desired description of a man. He says that every man desires to be described as virtuous because virtue is the greatest compliment afforded man. He then explains why it is that usefulness (utility) causes pleasure. Hume says that when something proves useful, it gives direct benefit to the person describing it as useful, and it is from this application to self (self love) that the pleasure arises.
In the next section, Hume discusses the “qualities useful to ourselves.” He makes the point that it is less about the quality in question and more about the degree of the quality, as “no quality…is absolutely either blameable or praise-worthy.” He explains this point using different qualities.
Continuing in his discussion of agreeable qualities, Hume then presents qualities which he claims are immediately agreeable. He uses cheerfulness as an example, but also discusses dangerousness as the reverse: an immediately disagreeable quality. Courage and tranquility are two more examples he uses. I found his arguments here to be particularly convincing.
Section 8 discussed a few of the qualities that others immediately find agreeable. Ingenuity, good manners and politeness, and decency provided support for his arguments here. I had a bit of difficulty understanding exactly how Hume distinguished between the qualities immediately agreeable and immediately agreeable to others. I am not sure I understand well enough to be able to distinguish should I be handed a list and asked to sort them into their separate categories.

In the first chapter, Hume addresses the importance of philosophy in being the foundation and the reason for discussions of principles. Hume says that it is necessary to understand what it is that you are arguing for, but to also be willing to listen to other arguments and consider them justly.
He then moves into a discussion of morals and that which we base them on. He says that some may argue that morals are based on reason, whereas others would state that morals are based on sentiment, based on emotion and virtue, which is itself based on amiability. But “render men totally indifferent towards these distinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions.” (pg 75, 7)
From this comes the talk of benevolence and the natural virtues. Hume makes the argument that the greatest compliment one can be given is to be credited with being a virtuous person. To behave sympathetically is to live a good life and to be respected.
Hume once again raises the discussion of justice, which he says is relative to the situation. He talks about the idea theocracy, one in which everyone and everything would work to promote the public good which would ideally lead to universal equality, but also states that this equality, while wonderful sounding, is completely impractical. This slips right into the discussion of property and its distribution.
The final section for today’s readings covered the discussion of political society. This goes back to justice and the ways in which men make decisions, whether for personal gain or public good. Hume also talks of chastity, with an emphasis on its relevance for women more significantly than for men. I must admit, I found this somewhat out of place, which may be because of confusion about the transitioning argument. Hume ended this section by addressing the idea that rules dictate every action, even those that goes against social norms (including, but not limited to, murder).

Book III, Part 1, Section 1 introduces the concept of moral distinctions not derived from reason.” In this section Hume is addressing the idea that morality comes from perceptions which are of impressions and ideas. This is different from reason. Morality is not necessarily based on one’s passions, but rather one’s impressions and ideas.
Section 2 asks the question “of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us?” Hume’s answer is that pleasure is a direct result of moral action.
In Part 2, Section 1, Hume makes the argument that justice is an artificial virtue, as it comes about based on the circumstances we find ourselves in.
Section 2 suggests that justice originates in the “selfishness and confin’d generosity of man, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants.” I am not entirely sure what Hume means by this.
Section 3 defines the idea of property and the rules by which one distinguishes to whom such property belongs.
Continuing on these same concepts, Section 4 gives explanation of the ways in which this property is disbursed and the means by which it can be transferred from one person to another.
In Section 5, I found Hume’s argument regarding promises to be confusing. I believe in the beginning that he is saying that a promise is really of no consequence, as to promise does not provide obligation to perform in the way promised. However, Hume’s final statement in this section seems contradictory: “A man, dangerously wounded, who promises a competent sum to a surgeon to cure him, wou’d certainly be bound to performance; tho’ the case be not so much different from that of one who promises a sum to a robber, as to produce so great a difference in our sentiments or morality, if these sentiments were not built entirely on public interest and convenience.” I did not find the explanation in between to be particularly helpful.
The final section for today’s discussion, Section 6, makes a few final arguments about justice and property, including that the definition (a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due) is inappropriate; that property, right and obligation are artificial virtues; and that vice and virtue are so closely related that it is often difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins.

“There is no spectacle so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous action; nor any which gives us more abhorrence than one that is cruel and treacherous. No enjoyment equals the satisfaction we receive from the company of those we love and esteem; as the greatest of all punishments is to be oblig’d to pass our lives with those we hate or contemn. A very play or romance may afford us instances of this pleasure, which virtue conveys to us; and pain, which arises from vice.” (pg 302, 3.1.2.2)
“After the same manner, when we require any action, or blame a person for not performing it, we always suppose, that one in that situation shou’d be influenc’d by the proper motive of that action, and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it. If we find, upon enquiry, that the virtuous motive was still powerful over his breast, tho’ check’d in its operation by some circumstances unknown to us, we retract our blame, and have the same esteem for him, as if he had actually perform’d the action, which we require of him.” (pg, 307, 3.2.1.3)
I particularly enjoyed these two passages because I find them especially applicable in modern times.
“…’tis only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of man, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origins.” (pg 318, 3.2.2.18)
I simply do not understand what Hume means in this passage.

The difference between a calm and a violent passion is the degree to which the passion is felt. This is based on situations and circumstances. “’Tis remarkable, that lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination. In this respect, as well as others, the force of the passion depends as much on the temper of the person, as the nature or situation of the object.” (pg 273, 2.3.6.9)

“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”
I believe it is Hume’s intention in this argument to express his opinion that an individual person’s reason is based on that person’s disposition. His passions are toward one end or another, and as a direct result, his reason can be toward one extreme or the other. This could also be affected by his situation.
Although this statement was made by Hume during the 19th century, we see it holding true even today. An example provided by another writer (Doris, I believe) discussed in this class says that a person who is inclined to be of aid to others may or may not stop to help someone who has spilled the contents of his briefcase on the floor. Despite the person’s inclination, the situation may or may not warrant the assistance being provided.
Another good example would be the Kitty Genovise incident. Although people in the surrounding buildings and those passing nearby could hear Kitty screaming for help, each believed that someone else would provide assistance. Each person’s reason told them to pass and leave the action to someone else. These people’s particular passions were likely not to jump to another’s aid.

“There is not in my opinion any other natural cause, why security diminishes the passions, than because it removes that uncertainty, which encreases them. The mind, when left to itself, immediately languishes; and in order to preserve its ardour, must be every moment supported by a new flow of passion. For the same reason, despair, tho’ contrary to security, has a like influence.” (pg 270, 2.3.4.8)
I am not sure I entirely understand what Hume is saying here.
“One can consider the clouds, and heavens, and trees, and stones, however frequently repeated, without ever feeling any aversion. But when the fair sex, or music, or good cheer, or anything that naturally ought to be agreeable, becomes indifferent, it easily produces the opposite affection.” (pg 271, 2.3.5.4)
“Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are represented in their strongest and most lively colours. We may of ourselves acknowledge, that such an object is valuable, and such another odious; but till an orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections.” (pg 273, 2.3.6.8)
I find these two quotes to be particularly interesting. The first provides, at least in my mind, an extremely compelling support for the argument addressed. The second provides a very valid point concerning the ability of skilled speakers to sway the views of others. Not only do I believe this is true, I find this section to be exceptionally well written in terms of pleasant and persuasive wording.

In Book II, Section 1, Hume divides the mind into impressions and ideas. From here, impressions is divided into original (sensation) and secondary (reflection). The reflective impressions are divided further into the calm and the violent passions. These passions, says Hume, can be either direct (pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity) or indirect (desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, security).
Hume uses Section 2 to discuss two impressions, pride and humility, which he states cannot be experienced together, for the presentation of one cancels out that of the other. Although they have the same object (self), the concepts themselves are contradictory. This transitions into Section 3 which addresses the differences between the objects and causes and from what the are derived. Moving on to Section 7, Hume further discusses the issue of the derivation of the causes of pride and humility. He first focuses on vice and virtue, stating that those things that we find painful (vice) are of pride, while those found pleasurable (virtue) are of humility. “Humility exalts, but pride mortifies us.” (pg 193) Section 8 makes comparisons between the impressions pride and humility and beauty and deformity, with beauty causing delight or pleasure and being a virtue or of humility, and the like for deformity and pride. But not all pride or humility comes from something that directly affects or is of direct relation to the self, as discussed in Section 9. “But tho’ pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body, that is self, for their natural and more immediate causes, we find by experience, that there are many other objects, which produce these affections…” (pg 198, 1) Section 10 provides an example of this concept in property, which Hume says can be a cause of pride. A vain man prides himself in possessing the best of everything: house, furniture, clothing, horses, etc. He delights in power and the riches power affords. In the next section, this idea is continued with a discussion on the “love of fame.” Hume says that “our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance.” (pg 206, 1) In conclusion of Part 1 of Book 2, Hume addresses the theory of pride and humility in regard to animals. He says that it is because pride and humility are based on feelings of pain and pleasure that they are able to be experienced by all, which makes them such defining characteristics of life itself.
Book II, Part 2, Section 1 begins with the discussion of love and hatred. Hume believes that the causes of love and hatred are similar to those of pride and humility; feelings of pleasure and pain, and that the object is again self or an identical person. Section 3 breaks down into two ideas: “First, In removing some difficulties, concerning particular causes of these passions. Secondly, In examining the compound affections, which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions.” (pg 225, 1) Section 4 explains the existence of love, specifically between one individual and one object, or between two individuals. In Section 5, Hume describes the difference between love, as defined earlier as the relationship between one individual and an object or between two individuals, and esteem, the emotion one feels for a person who possesses riches or power. The next section is focused on the defining of the terms benevolence and anger. Hume argues that it is the conjunction between love and hatred and benevolence and anger that distinguishes them from pride and humility. According to the theories in Section 7, it is relatively easy to follow these same ideas that have been used throughout Part 2 of Book II, to “explain the passion of pity, from the precedent reasoning concerning sympathy.” (pg 238, 2) In the final section for today’s discussion, Hume continues with his defining of terms by discussion the ideas of malice as being related to pity.



“Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification than a disappointment in any attempt of that nature. No one has ever been able to tell what wit is, and to show why such a system of thought must be received under that denomination, and such another rejected.” (pg 194, 7)
I enjoyed the explanation given here and find myself agreeing with Hume.
“But beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction; as deformity produces pain, upon whatever subject it may be placed, and whether surveyed in an animate or inanimate object. If the beauty or deformity, therefore, be placed upon our own bodies, this pleasure or uneasiness must be converted into pride or humility, as having in this case all the circumstances requisite to produce a perfect transition of impressions and idea. These opposite sensations are related to the opposite passions. No wonder, then, our own beauty becomes an object of pride, and deformity of humility.” (pg 195, 1)
I had difficulty understanding the change Hume makes from the beginning of the statement to the end. I feel as though he might be contradicting himself.

Referring only to the three tendencies (to have our emotional state influenced by the emotional state of those around us; our feelings about our own situation are influenced by how we see our own situation in comparison to that of others; that we like pleasure and try to avoid discomfort or pain), Hume explains our moral views and even our belief that our moral views reflect not our human biases, but, instead, something objective.

To make for an easier time maintaining consistency, allow me to speak as though I were in fact Hume, making all statements using the pronouns “I” and “me.” Further, please keep in mind that I am basing this post strictly on assumptions, and am not claiming to be certain or to be any more correct that any other proposition.
I should like to think that because people tend to be such social beings even the most complex concepts, the very foundations of our existence (in this situation moral views), are influenced significantly by others. Because we are so aware of the emotions of those around us, because we experience such empathy for the important actors in our lives, and because we are so controlled by emotion, it is relatively easy for the feelings of others to sway our beliefs and resulting actions. Morality is determined by society. It is dictated by those who are persuasive and powerful.
As for the question of whether our moral views reflect our human biases or something objective, I disagree with the concept of human biases in this context in general. If we agree to continue with the line of thinking that says that people can be swayed by others’ feelings, then I think it is safe to say that “human biases” is an inappropriate term here. Allow me to explain: if it is a human bias for one or a few, can it still be considered a human bias when it applies to everyone? Maybe you disagree with me, but I think that once a “human bias” has been embraced by so many (in this case the majority of the world’s population), it stops being a human bias and becomes a social norm. This then is in direct support of the idea that our moral views reflect not our human biases, but something objective.

Doris puts a lot of faith in the theory that environmental factors play a major role in people’s actions. He argues that Aristotle put too much responsibility on people’s character. According to Aristotle, a person behaves virtuously because he is a virtuous person. In the same way, a vicious person is so because he behaves viciously. This theory is suggesting that people’s actions are based on their personalities, and vice versa. While Doris agrees that a person’s disposition might encourage him to behave honorably, if the situation does not provide gain (a found coin in the coin return of a payphone), the likelihood of the person doing this honorable deed (picking up spilt papers for a stranger) is reduced, whether the person is self-interested or particularly helpful by nature.




“…trait attribution is often surprisingly inefficacious in predicting behavior in particular novel situations, because differing behavioral outcomes often seem a function of situational variation more than individual disposition. To put things crudely, people typically lack character.” Doris pg 4

“…behavioral variation among individuals often owes more to distinct circumstances than distinct personalities; the difference between the person who behaves honestly and the one who fails to do so, for example, may be more a function of situation than character. Moreover, behavior may vary quite radically when compared with that expected on the postulation of a given trait. We have little assurance that a person to whom we attributed a trait will consistently behave in a trait-relevant fashion across a run of trait-relevant situations with variable pressures to such behavior; the putatively "honest" person may very well not consistently display honest behavior across a diversity of situations where honesty is appropriate.” Doris pg 6

“So things done are called just and moderate whenever they are such that the just person or the moderate person would do them; whereas a person is not just and moderate because he does these things, but also because he does them in the way in which just and moderate people do them. So it is appropriate to say that the just person comes about from doing what is just, and the moderate person form doing what is moderate…” Aristotle pg 115 1105b5

“Nevertheless, even in these circumstances the quality of fineness shines through, when someone bears repeated and great misfortunes calmly, not because he is insensitive to them but because he is a person of nobility and greatness of soul. If one’s activities are what determines the quality of one’s life, as we have said, no one who is blessed will become miserable; for he will never do what is hateful and vile.” Aristotle pg 107 1100b30

One can distinguish between phronesis and the other intellectual virtues by looking at the way these wisdoms are reached. For phronesis, deliberation is necessary. One must consider all angles of the issues and come to an appropriate conclusion. The other intellectual virtues, however, are based on learned skills. They become areas of expertise by practice.

“So whether women have a moral right to terminate their pregnancies is irrelevant within virtue theory, for it is irrelevant to the question “In having an abortion in these circumstances, would the agent be acting virtuously or viciously or neither?” pg 14
I do not really understand his argument here because later he discusses the ways in which the question of morality is based on Aristotle’s virtue theory.

“Nothing that happened in the past is subject to decision—e.g. no one decides to have sacked Troy, for no one deliberates about the past, either, but rather about what is to come, and what is possible, whereas it is not possible for what has happened not to have happened—so Agathon was right:
For even from god this power is kept, this power alone:
To make it true that what’s been done had never been.” pg 178
I think this is an important concept to learn: that what is done is done. So, why suffer the past? One should just move on; live in the today.

“This eye of the soul does not come to be in its proper condition without excellence, as has been said and as is clear in any case; for chains of practical reasoning have a starting point—‘since the end, i.e. what is best, is such-and-such’ (whatever it may be: for the sake of argument let it be anything one happens to choose), and this is not evident except to the person who possesses excellence, since badness distorts a person and causes him to be deceived about the starting points of action. So it is evident that it is impossible to be wise without possessing excellence.” pg 188
I am not sure I understand.

“These convictions, I suspect, are rooted in the desire to solve the problem of abortion by getting it to fall under some general rule such as “You ought not to kill anything with the right to life but may kill anything else.” pg 15
I believe this is an accurate depiction of the abortion argument.

“Imagine (or recall) a woman who already has children; she had not intended to have more, but finds herself unexpectedly pregnant. Though contrary to her plans, the pregnancy, once established as a fact, is welcomed—and then she loses the embryo almost immediately. If this were bemoaned as a tragedy, it would, I think be a misapplication of the concept of what is tragic…The application of tragic becomes more appropriate as the fetus grows, for the mere fact that one has lived with it for longer, conscious of its existence, makes a difference.” pg 18
I simply have trouble seeing the logic here.

1. What is it about a particular characteristic that makes it virtuous? Distinguishes it from its associated vices?
A particular characteristic is considered virtuous when it falls into one of the following categories:
• when it is difficult to do but is done anyway
• when it is frightening to do but is done anyway
• when it is of benefit to others and is done
• when it is of harm to others and is avoided

2. Do you agree with Aristotle that the closer you come to having these characteristics, the closer you will come to having a fulfilling life? What evidence have you drawn upon to defend your agreement or disagreement?
I completely agree. I find that when I behave virtuously, I can be proud of
my life and my choices. I also find that the resulting happiness is what I use to define “fulfilling” in the context of living a fulfilling life. My evidence here is merely personal experience, although I believe I could find others who, based on their own personal experiences, would agree with me.

Nicomachean Ethics Day 1

Aristotle argues that in order to have a fulfilling life, one must be virtuous.
In order to become virtuous, one must strive to partake in virtuous behaviors. One must practice doing virtuous deeds, because with practice comes fluency, and fluency in virtuous actions leads to a virtuous life.
But what makes a behavior virtuous? Behaviors which are easy or convenient are not particularly virtuous. It is those behaviors that are difficult, which often times require going against the majority, that are virtuous. These actions result in some good toward others. This can be used as a definition of virtue: moral excellence or goodness.


“The pleasure or pain that supervenes on what people do should be treated as a sign of their dispositions; for someone who holds back from bodily pleasure and does so cheerfully is a moderate person, while someone who is upset at doing so is self-indulgent, and someone who withstands frightening things and does so cheerfully, or anyway without distress, is a courageous person, while someone who is distressed at them is cowardly. For excellence of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad things, and because of pain that we hold back from doing fine things.” pg 113 II.3

“But most people fail to do these things, and by raking refuge in talk they think that they are philosophizing, and that they will become excellent this way, so behaving rather like sick people, when they listen carefully to their doctors but the fail to do anything of what is prescribed for them. Well, just as the latter, for their part, won’t be in good bodily condition if the look after themselves like that, neither will the former have their souls in good condition if they philosophize like that.” pg 115 1105b10.5

I think the only end that one can claim is the goal of every human being would be to achieve ultimate happiness.
Now, of course, ultimate happiness is a relative term: each person’s definition is dependent on his own disposition.
The evidence is clear and overwhelming.
For some, the ultimate happiness is thought to be achieved through wealth. For this reason, people work long hours, spending little or no time with families. They continue to work in jobs they despise because the pay is good and the security of having a normal routine is comfortable.
For others, the ultimate happiness is marriage and a family. For this reason, people search for years for “that special someone.” They devote their lives not necessarily to enjoying being alive, but to finding someone that makes being alive feel like everything. They get married and have children.
While few people who devote their lives to gaining wealth find this ultimate happiness, it is much more likely in the family scenario.
Why is this?
There could be any number of reasons. One which seems particularly probable is the idea that ultimate happiness is obtained by finding someone who is more important to yourself than you are. This would explain why happiness would be present in a family more than in a relationship with finances.
Which leads to the next question: How do we achieve ultimate happiness?
For those who believe that ultimate happiness is found in a marriage partner and offspring, the pathway is pretty well paved.
However, should you find that you truly have no desire to spend your life with someone else, it is still of benefit to find someone, or in more cases something, that you are able to see as more important than yourself.
If work is something you want to devote your life to, find something that is meaning, something that makes you feel good about yourself.
If excitement is your passion, see the world. Experience all there is to experience. Try skydiving, bungee jumping and all of those activities you never thought (or maybe always dreamed) you would do.
The key here is to find something that makes you happy and run with it.

Socrates’ argument:
Socrates is right, and it is better to suffer wrong than to wrong someone else.
“Pay attention. then, as they say. It’s an excellent explanation. I expect you’ll think that what I’m about to tell you is just a story, but to my mind it does explain things, since it is, as far as I’m concerned, the truth.” pg129
“It’s completely irrational, and a sign of sheer cowardice, to fear the mere fact of death, but the same cannot be said for fear of injustice, since arriving in Hades with one’s soul riddled with wrongdoings is the ultimate evil.” pg 129
“He doesn’t know whose soul it is; in fact, he might well get hold of the soul of the king of Persia or some other king or potentate and notice that it’s riddled with defects—scourged and covered in the scars which ever dishonest and unjust action has imprinted on it, utterly crippled by lies and arrogance and warped by a truth-free diet—and he’d also see that the promiscuity, sensuality, brutality, and self-indulgence of his behaviour has thoroughly distorted the harmony and beauty of his soul.” pg 131
“…when Rhadamanthys gets hold of someone like that, he doesn’t even know his name or his background; all he knows is that he’s a bad man.” pg 133


Callicles’ argument:
Socrates is wrong and uses words to confuse people into believing anything he says.
“…where I think Polus was at fault was in agreeing with you that doing wrong is more contemptible than suffering wrong. It was this admission of his which enabled you to tie him up in logical knots and muzzle him…” pg 65
“I don’t know how you do it, Socrates, but you twist every single one of our arguments until it’s back to front.”

My own comments:
I did not like this particular reading. Callicles does not seem to be raising any real argument, merely attempting to discredit Socrates. Socrates in return seems to be antagonizing Callicles by using points raised in the discussion he began with Gorgias and continued with Polus to continue the argument that ended his conversation with Polus: that it is better to suffer harm than to cause harm to others. That having been said, it seems that we could have done without this final section entirely. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Plato used this last section to allow Socrates to make a point with which Plato agreed, and seemingly which Plato considered extremely important. He could probably have achieved this by cutting out the lines by Callicles altogether.

First Reading from Gorgias

Here is some discussion of the first reading from Gorgias.


Socrates’ argument against Gorgias:
"When there’s a public meeting in Athens to elect a doctor or a shipwright or any other professional, the purpose of the meeting is obviously to choose the person with the greatest expertise for each post, so it’s not going to be a rhetorician who advises then under these circumstances, is it? They’re not going to use rhetoricians to advise them when there are fortifications to be built or harbours or dockyards to be constructed: they’ll use master builders.”
Gorgias’ argument against Socrates:
“You don’t know the half of it, Socrates! Almost every accomplishment falls within the scope of rhetoric. I’ve for good evidence of this. Often in the past, when I’ve gone with my brother or some other doctor to one of their patients who was refusing to take his medicine or to let the doctor operate on him or cauterize him, the doctor proved incapable of persuading the patient to accept his treatment, but I succeeded, even though I didn’t have any other expertise to draw on except rhetoric.”
My comments:
Socrates bases his entire discussion with Gorgias on the question of relevance of rhetoric. This passage describes this lack of understanding well. Socrates is asking how necessary rhetoric can be when there seems to be no expertise involved in regards to situations in which expertise is of great use. In response, Gorgias claims that the relevance of rhetoric is made obvious when those with the expertise are unable to convince people of their opinions, a task easily accomplished by those well versed in rhetoric.

Socrates’ argument against Polus:
“Well, in my opinion, it doesn’t involve expertise; all you need is a mind which is good at guessing, some courage, and a natural talent for interacting, with people. The general term I use to refer to it is ‘flattery’, and this strikes me as a multi-faceted activity, one of whose branches is cookery. And what I’m saying about cookery is that it does seem to be a branch of expertise, but in fact isn’t; it’s a knack, acquired by habituation.”
Polus’ argument against Socrates:
“Rhetoricians are the most powerful members of their communities, aren’t they? Don’t they resemble dictators in that they can execute anyone they want, and confiscate a person’s property and then banish that person from their community if it seems best? As if you wouldn’t prefer to be able to do whatever you felt like doing in your community rather than the opposite, Socrates! You make it sound as though the sight of someone executing people when he thinks it’s best, or confiscating their property, or throwing them into prison, doesn’t make you envious.”
My comments:
Once again Socrates is questioning the idea of rhetoric involving expertise. Socrates claims that rhetoric is instead about making people feel good (flattery) about the issues of which you are trying to persuade them, thus encouraging them to go along with your ways of thinking. Polus replies with the claim that the ability to convince anyone of anything makes rhetoricians more powerful than any other professional.

Enough on the basics; let’s switch gears and discuss the topics for Day 3.

A. In a situation where one person is being harmed and the other is doing the harming, which is most to be avoided, harming the other or being harmed by another? Why? What if the person doing the harming will not get caught? What if the person doing the harming can avoid feeling guilty? The harms we’re talking about can be minor (stealing parking place), moderate (embezzlement) or major (genocide).
B. What skills should we work to possess, the skills to persuade others to agree with our beliefs or the skills to discern whether the beliefs we have are true or false?
What do A and B have in common?

A. DISCLAIMER: I am currently in neither position, and that considered, my actions should I find myself in either situation may in fact be different than the opinions expressed at this time.
That having been said, the preferred position would be the one being harmed. While I often complain that “there are no good parking spots. I don’t want to have to walk that far!” I would much prefer that the spots be taken by those who need them (mothers with children in tow, the elderly who have difficulty walking for long periods of time, etc). And even considering the amount of pain I could possibly suffer at the hands of someone participating in immoral (there’s that concept again) behaviors, it would be nothing compared to the pain I would (hopefully) experience knowing the abomination that I have become and the discomfort I have caused for others.
This logic would continue to be applicable in the situation in which I would not be caught in my actions, because the disappointment in self would still be present. However, this would be much less applicable should I have the misfortune of losing the very values on which I have based my entire existence and forgetting how to feel responsible (I believe the term used in the question was guilty) for my actions.
B. I am of the opinion that the preferable skills would be the ones to discern whether the beliefs we have are true or false. What good is it to be able to convince others to believe you if you are unsure if you are claiming something that should be believed? I would much rather know I am right and have no one believe me than to wonder if I had convinced a hundred people of something that is false.
The sets of questions explore fairly unrelated issues. The commonalities between the two concepts discussed might possibly include the ideas of right and wrong. Obviously, to be causing harm to someone else is, at least in the majority of cases, wrong. Along those same lines, to convince someone of something that is clearly incorrect could be considered wrong.
That’s all I have for Day 3.

Our small group for Day 2 was a good one. Conversation was light and friendly, despite discussing some rather controversial topics. Here are some thoughts on the conversation.

The questions all discussed the idea of right and wrong versus moral and immoral. The four of us seemed to agree (at least to a degree) that morality can be thought of as a degree of right. By this I mean that many people seem to view somewhat less significant actions that they see as being less than desire to be wrong, while actions that seem to be much more significant they see as being immoral. To further explain this idea, consider the following example:
Let’s imagine that when asked if I had done the readings for class my response was yes, when in fact the truth was no. This lie would be considered wrong. We are taught this concept from an early age. Lying is wrong. I know few, if any, people who would say that this is immoral.
Now let’s imagine that I witness a murder (to continue with the idea of extremity used in this example, shall we say a quadruple murder, the victims of which included a pregnant woman and two toddler-aged children) and am asked to testify. When asked who I saw commit the murder, suppose I claim, due to some personal dislike for the man, that it was the woman’s husband and the children’s father, when in fact, I know full well it was not. I’m thinking it might be a safe assumption here to say that most people would consider this lie to be more than wrong, probably downright immoral.
Thus we see the difference (at least in my opinion): the degree of the lie (small and insignificant versus large and life altering).
Transitioning right into the next question, another possible reason for the distinction between the two uses is the level of effect each term has on the person to whom the term is applied. “Immoral” seems to carry more weight than “wrong.” I would much rather be called wrong than immoral.
All of this having been said, what makes something “immoral”? Well, that certainly seems to be an easily answered question: society. Can anyone argue that morality is not, at least largely, based on the ideals and norms that society has established for us?

Intro

Oye. This blog is for my Philosophy class on Ethics.
Should be a good class.
Here's hoping, right?