In Book II, Section 1, Hume divides the mind into impressions and ideas. From here, impressions is divided into original (sensation) and secondary (reflection). The reflective impressions are divided further into the calm and the violent passions. These passions, says Hume, can be either direct (pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity) or indirect (desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, security).
Hume uses Section 2 to discuss two impressions, pride and humility, which he states cannot be experienced together, for the presentation of one cancels out that of the other. Although they have the same object (self), the concepts themselves are contradictory. This transitions into Section 3 which addresses the differences between the objects and causes and from what the are derived. Moving on to Section 7, Hume further discusses the issue of the derivation of the causes of pride and humility. He first focuses on vice and virtue, stating that those things that we find painful (vice) are of pride, while those found pleasurable (virtue) are of humility. “Humility exalts, but pride mortifies us.” (pg 193) Section 8 makes comparisons between the impressions pride and humility and beauty and deformity, with beauty causing delight or pleasure and being a virtue or of humility, and the like for deformity and pride. But not all pride or humility comes from something that directly affects or is of direct relation to the self, as discussed in Section 9. “But tho’ pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body, that is self, for their natural and more immediate causes, we find by experience, that there are many other objects, which produce these affections…” (pg 198, 1) Section 10 provides an example of this concept in property, which Hume says can be a cause of pride. A vain man prides himself in possessing the best of everything: house, furniture, clothing, horses, etc. He delights in power and the riches power affords. In the next section, this idea is continued with a discussion on the “love of fame.” Hume says that “our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance.” (pg 206, 1) In conclusion of Part 1 of Book 2, Hume addresses the theory of pride and humility in regard to animals. He says that it is because pride and humility are based on feelings of pain and pleasure that they are able to be experienced by all, which makes them such defining characteristics of life itself.
Book II, Part 2, Section 1 begins with the discussion of love and hatred. Hume believes that the causes of love and hatred are similar to those of pride and humility; feelings of pleasure and pain, and that the object is again self or an identical person. Section 3 breaks down into two ideas: “First, In removing some difficulties, concerning particular causes of these passions. Secondly, In examining the compound affections, which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions.” (pg 225, 1) Section 4 explains the existence of love, specifically between one individual and one object, or between two individuals. In Section 5, Hume describes the difference between love, as defined earlier as the relationship between one individual and an object or between two individuals, and esteem, the emotion one feels for a person who possesses riches or power. The next section is focused on the defining of the terms benevolence and anger. Hume argues that it is the conjunction between love and hatred and benevolence and anger that distinguishes them from pride and humility. According to the theories in Section 7, it is relatively easy to follow these same ideas that have been used throughout Part 2 of Book II, to “explain the passion of pity, from the precedent reasoning concerning sympathy.” (pg 238, 2) In the final section for today’s discussion, Hume continues with his defining of terms by discussion the ideas of malice as being related to pity.



“Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification than a disappointment in any attempt of that nature. No one has ever been able to tell what wit is, and to show why such a system of thought must be received under that denomination, and such another rejected.” (pg 194, 7)
I enjoyed the explanation given here and find myself agreeing with Hume.
“But beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction; as deformity produces pain, upon whatever subject it may be placed, and whether surveyed in an animate or inanimate object. If the beauty or deformity, therefore, be placed upon our own bodies, this pleasure or uneasiness must be converted into pride or humility, as having in this case all the circumstances requisite to produce a perfect transition of impressions and idea. These opposite sensations are related to the opposite passions. No wonder, then, our own beauty becomes an object of pride, and deformity of humility.” (pg 195, 1)
I had difficulty understanding the change Hume makes from the beginning of the statement to the end. I feel as though he might be contradicting himself.