Book III, Part 1, Section 1 introduces the concept of moral distinctions not derived from reason.” In this section Hume is addressing the idea that morality comes from perceptions which are of impressions and ideas. This is different from reason. Morality is not necessarily based on one’s passions, but rather one’s impressions and ideas.
Section 2 asks the question “of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us?” Hume’s answer is that pleasure is a direct result of moral action.
In Part 2, Section 1, Hume makes the argument that justice is an artificial virtue, as it comes about based on the circumstances we find ourselves in.
Section 2 suggests that justice originates in the “selfishness and confin’d generosity of man, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants.” I am not entirely sure what Hume means by this.
Section 3 defines the idea of property and the rules by which one distinguishes to whom such property belongs.
Continuing on these same concepts, Section 4 gives explanation of the ways in which this property is disbursed and the means by which it can be transferred from one person to another.
In Section 5, I found Hume’s argument regarding promises to be confusing. I believe in the beginning that he is saying that a promise is really of no consequence, as to promise does not provide obligation to perform in the way promised. However, Hume’s final statement in this section seems contradictory: “A man, dangerously wounded, who promises a competent sum to a surgeon to cure him, wou’d certainly be bound to performance; tho’ the case be not so much different from that of one who promises a sum to a robber, as to produce so great a difference in our sentiments or morality, if these sentiments were not built entirely on public interest and convenience.” I did not find the explanation in between to be particularly helpful.
The final section for today’s discussion, Section 6, makes a few final arguments about justice and property, including that the definition (a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due) is inappropriate; that property, right and obligation are artificial virtues; and that vice and virtue are so closely related that it is often difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins.
“There is no spectacle so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous action; nor any which gives us more abhorrence than one that is cruel and treacherous. No enjoyment equals the satisfaction we receive from the company of those we love and esteem; as the greatest of all punishments is to be oblig’d to pass our lives with those we hate or contemn. A very play or romance may afford us instances of this pleasure, which virtue conveys to us; and pain, which arises from vice.” (pg 302, 3.1.2.2)
“After the same manner, when we require any action, or blame a person for not performing it, we always suppose, that one in that situation shou’d be influenc’d by the proper motive of that action, and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it. If we find, upon enquiry, that the virtuous motive was still powerful over his breast, tho’ check’d in its operation by some circumstances unknown to us, we retract our blame, and have the same esteem for him, as if he had actually perform’d the action, which we require of him.” (pg, 307, 3.2.1.3)
I particularly enjoyed these two passages because I find them especially applicable in modern times.
“…’tis only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of man, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origins.” (pg 318, 3.2.2.18)
I simply do not understand what Hume means in this passage.
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Friday, September 26, 2008
The difference between a calm and a violent passion is the degree to which the passion is felt. This is based on situations and circumstances. “’Tis remarkable, that lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination. In this respect, as well as others, the force of the passion depends as much on the temper of the person, as the nature or situation of the object.” (pg 273, 2.3.6.9)
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”
I believe it is Hume’s intention in this argument to express his opinion that an individual person’s reason is based on that person’s disposition. His passions are toward one end or another, and as a direct result, his reason can be toward one extreme or the other. This could also be affected by his situation.
Although this statement was made by Hume during the 19th century, we see it holding true even today. An example provided by another writer (Doris, I believe) discussed in this class says that a person who is inclined to be of aid to others may or may not stop to help someone who has spilled the contents of his briefcase on the floor. Despite the person’s inclination, the situation may or may not warrant the assistance being provided.
Another good example would be the Kitty Genovise incident. Although people in the surrounding buildings and those passing nearby could hear Kitty screaming for help, each believed that someone else would provide assistance. Each person’s reason told them to pass and leave the action to someone else. These people’s particular passions were likely not to jump to another’s aid.
“There is not in my opinion any other natural cause, why security diminishes the passions, than because it removes that uncertainty, which encreases them. The mind, when left to itself, immediately languishes; and in order to preserve its ardour, must be every moment supported by a new flow of passion. For the same reason, despair, tho’ contrary to security, has a like influence.” (pg 270, 2.3.4.8)
I am not sure I entirely understand what Hume is saying here.
“One can consider the clouds, and heavens, and trees, and stones, however frequently repeated, without ever feeling any aversion. But when the fair sex, or music, or good cheer, or anything that naturally ought to be agreeable, becomes indifferent, it easily produces the opposite affection.” (pg 271, 2.3.5.4)
“Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are represented in their strongest and most lively colours. We may of ourselves acknowledge, that such an object is valuable, and such another odious; but till an orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections.” (pg 273, 2.3.6.8)
I find these two quotes to be particularly interesting. The first provides, at least in my mind, an extremely compelling support for the argument addressed. The second provides a very valid point concerning the ability of skilled speakers to sway the views of others. Not only do I believe this is true, I find this section to be exceptionally well written in terms of pleasant and persuasive wording.
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”
I believe it is Hume’s intention in this argument to express his opinion that an individual person’s reason is based on that person’s disposition. His passions are toward one end or another, and as a direct result, his reason can be toward one extreme or the other. This could also be affected by his situation.
Although this statement was made by Hume during the 19th century, we see it holding true even today. An example provided by another writer (Doris, I believe) discussed in this class says that a person who is inclined to be of aid to others may or may not stop to help someone who has spilled the contents of his briefcase on the floor. Despite the person’s inclination, the situation may or may not warrant the assistance being provided.
Another good example would be the Kitty Genovise incident. Although people in the surrounding buildings and those passing nearby could hear Kitty screaming for help, each believed that someone else would provide assistance. Each person’s reason told them to pass and leave the action to someone else. These people’s particular passions were likely not to jump to another’s aid.
“There is not in my opinion any other natural cause, why security diminishes the passions, than because it removes that uncertainty, which encreases them. The mind, when left to itself, immediately languishes; and in order to preserve its ardour, must be every moment supported by a new flow of passion. For the same reason, despair, tho’ contrary to security, has a like influence.” (pg 270, 2.3.4.8)
I am not sure I entirely understand what Hume is saying here.
“One can consider the clouds, and heavens, and trees, and stones, however frequently repeated, without ever feeling any aversion. But when the fair sex, or music, or good cheer, or anything that naturally ought to be agreeable, becomes indifferent, it easily produces the opposite affection.” (pg 271, 2.3.5.4)
“Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are represented in their strongest and most lively colours. We may of ourselves acknowledge, that such an object is valuable, and such another odious; but till an orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections.” (pg 273, 2.3.6.8)
I find these two quotes to be particularly interesting. The first provides, at least in my mind, an extremely compelling support for the argument addressed. The second provides a very valid point concerning the ability of skilled speakers to sway the views of others. Not only do I believe this is true, I find this section to be exceptionally well written in terms of pleasant and persuasive wording.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
In Book II, Section 1, Hume divides the mind into impressions and ideas. From here, impressions is divided into original (sensation) and secondary (reflection). The reflective impressions are divided further into the calm and the violent passions. These passions, says Hume, can be either direct (pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity) or indirect (desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, security).
Hume uses Section 2 to discuss two impressions, pride and humility, which he states cannot be experienced together, for the presentation of one cancels out that of the other. Although they have the same object (self), the concepts themselves are contradictory. This transitions into Section 3 which addresses the differences between the objects and causes and from what the are derived. Moving on to Section 7, Hume further discusses the issue of the derivation of the causes of pride and humility. He first focuses on vice and virtue, stating that those things that we find painful (vice) are of pride, while those found pleasurable (virtue) are of humility. “Humility exalts, but pride mortifies us.” (pg 193) Section 8 makes comparisons between the impressions pride and humility and beauty and deformity, with beauty causing delight or pleasure and being a virtue or of humility, and the like for deformity and pride. But not all pride or humility comes from something that directly affects or is of direct relation to the self, as discussed in Section 9. “But tho’ pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body, that is self, for their natural and more immediate causes, we find by experience, that there are many other objects, which produce these affections…” (pg 198, 1) Section 10 provides an example of this concept in property, which Hume says can be a cause of pride. A vain man prides himself in possessing the best of everything: house, furniture, clothing, horses, etc. He delights in power and the riches power affords. In the next section, this idea is continued with a discussion on the “love of fame.” Hume says that “our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance.” (pg 206, 1) In conclusion of Part 1 of Book 2, Hume addresses the theory of pride and humility in regard to animals. He says that it is because pride and humility are based on feelings of pain and pleasure that they are able to be experienced by all, which makes them such defining characteristics of life itself.
Book II, Part 2, Section 1 begins with the discussion of love and hatred. Hume believes that the causes of love and hatred are similar to those of pride and humility; feelings of pleasure and pain, and that the object is again self or an identical person. Section 3 breaks down into two ideas: “First, In removing some difficulties, concerning particular causes of these passions. Secondly, In examining the compound affections, which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions.” (pg 225, 1) Section 4 explains the existence of love, specifically between one individual and one object, or between two individuals. In Section 5, Hume describes the difference between love, as defined earlier as the relationship between one individual and an object or between two individuals, and esteem, the emotion one feels for a person who possesses riches or power. The next section is focused on the defining of the terms benevolence and anger. Hume argues that it is the conjunction between love and hatred and benevolence and anger that distinguishes them from pride and humility. According to the theories in Section 7, it is relatively easy to follow these same ideas that have been used throughout Part 2 of Book II, to “explain the passion of pity, from the precedent reasoning concerning sympathy.” (pg 238, 2) In the final section for today’s discussion, Hume continues with his defining of terms by discussion the ideas of malice as being related to pity.
“Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification than a disappointment in any attempt of that nature. No one has ever been able to tell what wit is, and to show why such a system of thought must be received under that denomination, and such another rejected.” (pg 194, 7)
I enjoyed the explanation given here and find myself agreeing with Hume.
“But beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction; as deformity produces pain, upon whatever subject it may be placed, and whether surveyed in an animate or inanimate object. If the beauty or deformity, therefore, be placed upon our own bodies, this pleasure or uneasiness must be converted into pride or humility, as having in this case all the circumstances requisite to produce a perfect transition of impressions and idea. These opposite sensations are related to the opposite passions. No wonder, then, our own beauty becomes an object of pride, and deformity of humility.” (pg 195, 1)
I had difficulty understanding the change Hume makes from the beginning of the statement to the end. I feel as though he might be contradicting himself.
Hume uses Section 2 to discuss two impressions, pride and humility, which he states cannot be experienced together, for the presentation of one cancels out that of the other. Although they have the same object (self), the concepts themselves are contradictory. This transitions into Section 3 which addresses the differences between the objects and causes and from what the are derived. Moving on to Section 7, Hume further discusses the issue of the derivation of the causes of pride and humility. He first focuses on vice and virtue, stating that those things that we find painful (vice) are of pride, while those found pleasurable (virtue) are of humility. “Humility exalts, but pride mortifies us.” (pg 193) Section 8 makes comparisons between the impressions pride and humility and beauty and deformity, with beauty causing delight or pleasure and being a virtue or of humility, and the like for deformity and pride. But not all pride or humility comes from something that directly affects or is of direct relation to the self, as discussed in Section 9. “But tho’ pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body, that is self, for their natural and more immediate causes, we find by experience, that there are many other objects, which produce these affections…” (pg 198, 1) Section 10 provides an example of this concept in property, which Hume says can be a cause of pride. A vain man prides himself in possessing the best of everything: house, furniture, clothing, horses, etc. He delights in power and the riches power affords. In the next section, this idea is continued with a discussion on the “love of fame.” Hume says that “our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance.” (pg 206, 1) In conclusion of Part 1 of Book 2, Hume addresses the theory of pride and humility in regard to animals. He says that it is because pride and humility are based on feelings of pain and pleasure that they are able to be experienced by all, which makes them such defining characteristics of life itself.
Book II, Part 2, Section 1 begins with the discussion of love and hatred. Hume believes that the causes of love and hatred are similar to those of pride and humility; feelings of pleasure and pain, and that the object is again self or an identical person. Section 3 breaks down into two ideas: “First, In removing some difficulties, concerning particular causes of these passions. Secondly, In examining the compound affections, which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions.” (pg 225, 1) Section 4 explains the existence of love, specifically between one individual and one object, or between two individuals. In Section 5, Hume describes the difference between love, as defined earlier as the relationship between one individual and an object or between two individuals, and esteem, the emotion one feels for a person who possesses riches or power. The next section is focused on the defining of the terms benevolence and anger. Hume argues that it is the conjunction between love and hatred and benevolence and anger that distinguishes them from pride and humility. According to the theories in Section 7, it is relatively easy to follow these same ideas that have been used throughout Part 2 of Book II, to “explain the passion of pity, from the precedent reasoning concerning sympathy.” (pg 238, 2) In the final section for today’s discussion, Hume continues with his defining of terms by discussion the ideas of malice as being related to pity.
“Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification than a disappointment in any attempt of that nature. No one has ever been able to tell what wit is, and to show why such a system of thought must be received under that denomination, and such another rejected.” (pg 194, 7)
I enjoyed the explanation given here and find myself agreeing with Hume.
“But beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction; as deformity produces pain, upon whatever subject it may be placed, and whether surveyed in an animate or inanimate object. If the beauty or deformity, therefore, be placed upon our own bodies, this pleasure or uneasiness must be converted into pride or humility, as having in this case all the circumstances requisite to produce a perfect transition of impressions and idea. These opposite sensations are related to the opposite passions. No wonder, then, our own beauty becomes an object of pride, and deformity of humility.” (pg 195, 1)
I had difficulty understanding the change Hume makes from the beginning of the statement to the end. I feel as though he might be contradicting himself.
Referring only to the three tendencies (to have our emotional state influenced by the emotional state of those around us; our feelings about our own situation are influenced by how we see our own situation in comparison to that of others; that we like pleasure and try to avoid discomfort or pain), Hume explains our moral views and even our belief that our moral views reflect not our human biases, but, instead, something objective.
To make for an easier time maintaining consistency, allow me to speak as though I were in fact Hume, making all statements using the pronouns “I” and “me.” Further, please keep in mind that I am basing this post strictly on assumptions, and am not claiming to be certain or to be any more correct that any other proposition.
I should like to think that because people tend to be such social beings even the most complex concepts, the very foundations of our existence (in this situation moral views), are influenced significantly by others. Because we are so aware of the emotions of those around us, because we experience such empathy for the important actors in our lives, and because we are so controlled by emotion, it is relatively easy for the feelings of others to sway our beliefs and resulting actions. Morality is determined by society. It is dictated by those who are persuasive and powerful.
As for the question of whether our moral views reflect our human biases or something objective, I disagree with the concept of human biases in this context in general. If we agree to continue with the line of thinking that says that people can be swayed by others’ feelings, then I think it is safe to say that “human biases” is an inappropriate term here. Allow me to explain: if it is a human bias for one or a few, can it still be considered a human bias when it applies to everyone? Maybe you disagree with me, but I think that once a “human bias” has been embraced by so many (in this case the majority of the world’s population), it stops being a human bias and becomes a social norm. This then is in direct support of the idea that our moral views reflect not our human biases, but something objective.
To make for an easier time maintaining consistency, allow me to speak as though I were in fact Hume, making all statements using the pronouns “I” and “me.” Further, please keep in mind that I am basing this post strictly on assumptions, and am not claiming to be certain or to be any more correct that any other proposition.
I should like to think that because people tend to be such social beings even the most complex concepts, the very foundations of our existence (in this situation moral views), are influenced significantly by others. Because we are so aware of the emotions of those around us, because we experience such empathy for the important actors in our lives, and because we are so controlled by emotion, it is relatively easy for the feelings of others to sway our beliefs and resulting actions. Morality is determined by society. It is dictated by those who are persuasive and powerful.
As for the question of whether our moral views reflect our human biases or something objective, I disagree with the concept of human biases in this context in general. If we agree to continue with the line of thinking that says that people can be swayed by others’ feelings, then I think it is safe to say that “human biases” is an inappropriate term here. Allow me to explain: if it is a human bias for one or a few, can it still be considered a human bias when it applies to everyone? Maybe you disagree with me, but I think that once a “human bias” has been embraced by so many (in this case the majority of the world’s population), it stops being a human bias and becomes a social norm. This then is in direct support of the idea that our moral views reflect not our human biases, but something objective.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Doris puts a lot of faith in the theory that environmental factors play a major role in people’s actions. He argues that Aristotle put too much responsibility on people’s character. According to Aristotle, a person behaves virtuously because he is a virtuous person. In the same way, a vicious person is so because he behaves viciously. This theory is suggesting that people’s actions are based on their personalities, and vice versa. While Doris agrees that a person’s disposition might encourage him to behave honorably, if the situation does not provide gain (a found coin in the coin return of a payphone), the likelihood of the person doing this honorable deed (picking up spilt papers for a stranger) is reduced, whether the person is self-interested or particularly helpful by nature.
“…trait attribution is often surprisingly inefficacious in predicting behavior in particular novel situations, because differing behavioral outcomes often seem a function of situational variation more than individual disposition. To put things crudely, people typically lack character.” Doris pg 4
“…behavioral variation among individuals often owes more to distinct circumstances than distinct personalities; the difference between the person who behaves honestly and the one who fails to do so, for example, may be more a function of situation than character. Moreover, behavior may vary quite radically when compared with that expected on the postulation of a given trait. We have little assurance that a person to whom we attributed a trait will consistently behave in a trait-relevant fashion across a run of trait-relevant situations with variable pressures to such behavior; the putatively "honest" person may very well not consistently display honest behavior across a diversity of situations where honesty is appropriate.” Doris pg 6
“So things done are called just and moderate whenever they are such that the just person or the moderate person would do them; whereas a person is not just and moderate because he does these things, but also because he does them in the way in which just and moderate people do them. So it is appropriate to say that the just person comes about from doing what is just, and the moderate person form doing what is moderate…” Aristotle pg 115 1105b5
“Nevertheless, even in these circumstances the quality of fineness shines through, when someone bears repeated and great misfortunes calmly, not because he is insensitive to them but because he is a person of nobility and greatness of soul. If one’s activities are what determines the quality of one’s life, as we have said, no one who is blessed will become miserable; for he will never do what is hateful and vile.” Aristotle pg 107 1100b30
“…trait attribution is often surprisingly inefficacious in predicting behavior in particular novel situations, because differing behavioral outcomes often seem a function of situational variation more than individual disposition. To put things crudely, people typically lack character.” Doris pg 4
“…behavioral variation among individuals often owes more to distinct circumstances than distinct personalities; the difference between the person who behaves honestly and the one who fails to do so, for example, may be more a function of situation than character. Moreover, behavior may vary quite radically when compared with that expected on the postulation of a given trait. We have little assurance that a person to whom we attributed a trait will consistently behave in a trait-relevant fashion across a run of trait-relevant situations with variable pressures to such behavior; the putatively "honest" person may very well not consistently display honest behavior across a diversity of situations where honesty is appropriate.” Doris pg 6
“So things done are called just and moderate whenever they are such that the just person or the moderate person would do them; whereas a person is not just and moderate because he does these things, but also because he does them in the way in which just and moderate people do them. So it is appropriate to say that the just person comes about from doing what is just, and the moderate person form doing what is moderate…” Aristotle pg 115 1105b5
“Nevertheless, even in these circumstances the quality of fineness shines through, when someone bears repeated and great misfortunes calmly, not because he is insensitive to them but because he is a person of nobility and greatness of soul. If one’s activities are what determines the quality of one’s life, as we have said, no one who is blessed will become miserable; for he will never do what is hateful and vile.” Aristotle pg 107 1100b30
Sunday, September 14, 2008
One can distinguish between phronesis and the other intellectual virtues by looking at the way these wisdoms are reached. For phronesis, deliberation is necessary. One must consider all angles of the issues and come to an appropriate conclusion. The other intellectual virtues, however, are based on learned skills. They become areas of expertise by practice.
“So whether women have a moral right to terminate their pregnancies is irrelevant within virtue theory, for it is irrelevant to the question “In having an abortion in these circumstances, would the agent be acting virtuously or viciously or neither?” pg 14
I do not really understand his argument here because later he discusses the ways in which the question of morality is based on Aristotle’s virtue theory.
“Nothing that happened in the past is subject to decision—e.g. no one decides to have sacked Troy, for no one deliberates about the past, either, but rather about what is to come, and what is possible, whereas it is not possible for what has happened not to have happened—so Agathon was right:
For even from god this power is kept, this power alone:
To make it true that what’s been done had never been.” pg 178
I think this is an important concept to learn: that what is done is done. So, why suffer the past? One should just move on; live in the today.
“This eye of the soul does not come to be in its proper condition without excellence, as has been said and as is clear in any case; for chains of practical reasoning have a starting point—‘since the end, i.e. what is best, is such-and-such’ (whatever it may be: for the sake of argument let it be anything one happens to choose), and this is not evident except to the person who possesses excellence, since badness distorts a person and causes him to be deceived about the starting points of action. So it is evident that it is impossible to be wise without possessing excellence.” pg 188
I am not sure I understand.
“These convictions, I suspect, are rooted in the desire to solve the problem of abortion by getting it to fall under some general rule such as “You ought not to kill anything with the right to life but may kill anything else.” pg 15
I believe this is an accurate depiction of the abortion argument.
“Imagine (or recall) a woman who already has children; she had not intended to have more, but finds herself unexpectedly pregnant. Though contrary to her plans, the pregnancy, once established as a fact, is welcomed—and then she loses the embryo almost immediately. If this were bemoaned as a tragedy, it would, I think be a misapplication of the concept of what is tragic…The application of tragic becomes more appropriate as the fetus grows, for the mere fact that one has lived with it for longer, conscious of its existence, makes a difference.” pg 18
I simply have trouble seeing the logic here.
“So whether women have a moral right to terminate their pregnancies is irrelevant within virtue theory, for it is irrelevant to the question “In having an abortion in these circumstances, would the agent be acting virtuously or viciously or neither?” pg 14
I do not really understand his argument here because later he discusses the ways in which the question of morality is based on Aristotle’s virtue theory.
“Nothing that happened in the past is subject to decision—e.g. no one decides to have sacked Troy, for no one deliberates about the past, either, but rather about what is to come, and what is possible, whereas it is not possible for what has happened not to have happened—so Agathon was right:
For even from god this power is kept, this power alone:
To make it true that what’s been done had never been.” pg 178
I think this is an important concept to learn: that what is done is done. So, why suffer the past? One should just move on; live in the today.
“This eye of the soul does not come to be in its proper condition without excellence, as has been said and as is clear in any case; for chains of practical reasoning have a starting point—‘since the end, i.e. what is best, is such-and-such’ (whatever it may be: for the sake of argument let it be anything one happens to choose), and this is not evident except to the person who possesses excellence, since badness distorts a person and causes him to be deceived about the starting points of action. So it is evident that it is impossible to be wise without possessing excellence.” pg 188
I am not sure I understand.
“These convictions, I suspect, are rooted in the desire to solve the problem of abortion by getting it to fall under some general rule such as “You ought not to kill anything with the right to life but may kill anything else.” pg 15
I believe this is an accurate depiction of the abortion argument.
“Imagine (or recall) a woman who already has children; she had not intended to have more, but finds herself unexpectedly pregnant. Though contrary to her plans, the pregnancy, once established as a fact, is welcomed—and then she loses the embryo almost immediately. If this were bemoaned as a tragedy, it would, I think be a misapplication of the concept of what is tragic…The application of tragic becomes more appropriate as the fetus grows, for the mere fact that one has lived with it for longer, conscious of its existence, makes a difference.” pg 18
I simply have trouble seeing the logic here.
Thursday, September 11, 2008
1. What is it about a particular characteristic that makes it virtuous? Distinguishes it from its associated vices?
A particular characteristic is considered virtuous when it falls into one of the following categories:
• when it is difficult to do but is done anyway
• when it is frightening to do but is done anyway
• when it is of benefit to others and is done
• when it is of harm to others and is avoided
2. Do you agree with Aristotle that the closer you come to having these characteristics, the closer you will come to having a fulfilling life? What evidence have you drawn upon to defend your agreement or disagreement?
I completely agree. I find that when I behave virtuously, I can be proud of
my life and my choices. I also find that the resulting happiness is what I use to define “fulfilling” in the context of living a fulfilling life. My evidence here is merely personal experience, although I believe I could find others who, based on their own personal experiences, would agree with me.
A particular characteristic is considered virtuous when it falls into one of the following categories:
• when it is difficult to do but is done anyway
• when it is frightening to do but is done anyway
• when it is of benefit to others and is done
• when it is of harm to others and is avoided
2. Do you agree with Aristotle that the closer you come to having these characteristics, the closer you will come to having a fulfilling life? What evidence have you drawn upon to defend your agreement or disagreement?
I completely agree. I find that when I behave virtuously, I can be proud of
my life and my choices. I also find that the resulting happiness is what I use to define “fulfilling” in the context of living a fulfilling life. My evidence here is merely personal experience, although I believe I could find others who, based on their own personal experiences, would agree with me.
Tuesday, September 9, 2008
Nicomachean Ethics Day 1
Aristotle argues that in order to have a fulfilling life, one must be virtuous.
In order to become virtuous, one must strive to partake in virtuous behaviors. One must practice doing virtuous deeds, because with practice comes fluency, and fluency in virtuous actions leads to a virtuous life.
But what makes a behavior virtuous? Behaviors which are easy or convenient are not particularly virtuous. It is those behaviors that are difficult, which often times require going against the majority, that are virtuous. These actions result in some good toward others. This can be used as a definition of virtue: moral excellence or goodness.
“The pleasure or pain that supervenes on what people do should be treated as a sign of their dispositions; for someone who holds back from bodily pleasure and does so cheerfully is a moderate person, while someone who is upset at doing so is self-indulgent, and someone who withstands frightening things and does so cheerfully, or anyway without distress, is a courageous person, while someone who is distressed at them is cowardly. For excellence of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad things, and because of pain that we hold back from doing fine things.” pg 113 II.3
“But most people fail to do these things, and by raking refuge in talk they think that they are philosophizing, and that they will become excellent this way, so behaving rather like sick people, when they listen carefully to their doctors but the fail to do anything of what is prescribed for them. Well, just as the latter, for their part, won’t be in good bodily condition if the look after themselves like that, neither will the former have their souls in good condition if they philosophize like that.” pg 115 1105b10.5
In order to become virtuous, one must strive to partake in virtuous behaviors. One must practice doing virtuous deeds, because with practice comes fluency, and fluency in virtuous actions leads to a virtuous life.
But what makes a behavior virtuous? Behaviors which are easy or convenient are not particularly virtuous. It is those behaviors that are difficult, which often times require going against the majority, that are virtuous. These actions result in some good toward others. This can be used as a definition of virtue: moral excellence or goodness.
“The pleasure or pain that supervenes on what people do should be treated as a sign of their dispositions; for someone who holds back from bodily pleasure and does so cheerfully is a moderate person, while someone who is upset at doing so is self-indulgent, and someone who withstands frightening things and does so cheerfully, or anyway without distress, is a courageous person, while someone who is distressed at them is cowardly. For excellence of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad things, and because of pain that we hold back from doing fine things.” pg 113 II.3
“But most people fail to do these things, and by raking refuge in talk they think that they are philosophizing, and that they will become excellent this way, so behaving rather like sick people, when they listen carefully to their doctors but the fail to do anything of what is prescribed for them. Well, just as the latter, for their part, won’t be in good bodily condition if the look after themselves like that, neither will the former have their souls in good condition if they philosophize like that.” pg 115 1105b10.5
Saturday, September 6, 2008
I think the only end that one can claim is the goal of every human being would be to achieve ultimate happiness.
Now, of course, ultimate happiness is a relative term: each person’s definition is dependent on his own disposition.
The evidence is clear and overwhelming.
For some, the ultimate happiness is thought to be achieved through wealth. For this reason, people work long hours, spending little or no time with families. They continue to work in jobs they despise because the pay is good and the security of having a normal routine is comfortable.
For others, the ultimate happiness is marriage and a family. For this reason, people search for years for “that special someone.” They devote their lives not necessarily to enjoying being alive, but to finding someone that makes being alive feel like everything. They get married and have children.
While few people who devote their lives to gaining wealth find this ultimate happiness, it is much more likely in the family scenario.
Why is this?
There could be any number of reasons. One which seems particularly probable is the idea that ultimate happiness is obtained by finding someone who is more important to yourself than you are. This would explain why happiness would be present in a family more than in a relationship with finances.
Which leads to the next question: How do we achieve ultimate happiness?
For those who believe that ultimate happiness is found in a marriage partner and offspring, the pathway is pretty well paved.
However, should you find that you truly have no desire to spend your life with someone else, it is still of benefit to find someone, or in more cases something, that you are able to see as more important than yourself.
If work is something you want to devote your life to, find something that is meaning, something that makes you feel good about yourself.
If excitement is your passion, see the world. Experience all there is to experience. Try skydiving, bungee jumping and all of those activities you never thought (or maybe always dreamed) you would do.
The key here is to find something that makes you happy and run with it.
Now, of course, ultimate happiness is a relative term: each person’s definition is dependent on his own disposition.
The evidence is clear and overwhelming.
For some, the ultimate happiness is thought to be achieved through wealth. For this reason, people work long hours, spending little or no time with families. They continue to work in jobs they despise because the pay is good and the security of having a normal routine is comfortable.
For others, the ultimate happiness is marriage and a family. For this reason, people search for years for “that special someone.” They devote their lives not necessarily to enjoying being alive, but to finding someone that makes being alive feel like everything. They get married and have children.
While few people who devote their lives to gaining wealth find this ultimate happiness, it is much more likely in the family scenario.
Why is this?
There could be any number of reasons. One which seems particularly probable is the idea that ultimate happiness is obtained by finding someone who is more important to yourself than you are. This would explain why happiness would be present in a family more than in a relationship with finances.
Which leads to the next question: How do we achieve ultimate happiness?
For those who believe that ultimate happiness is found in a marriage partner and offspring, the pathway is pretty well paved.
However, should you find that you truly have no desire to spend your life with someone else, it is still of benefit to find someone, or in more cases something, that you are able to see as more important than yourself.
If work is something you want to devote your life to, find something that is meaning, something that makes you feel good about yourself.
If excitement is your passion, see the world. Experience all there is to experience. Try skydiving, bungee jumping and all of those activities you never thought (or maybe always dreamed) you would do.
The key here is to find something that makes you happy and run with it.
Thursday, September 4, 2008
Socrates’ argument:
Socrates is right, and it is better to suffer wrong than to wrong someone else.
“Pay attention. then, as they say. It’s an excellent explanation. I expect you’ll think that what I’m about to tell you is just a story, but to my mind it does explain things, since it is, as far as I’m concerned, the truth.” pg129
“It’s completely irrational, and a sign of sheer cowardice, to fear the mere fact of death, but the same cannot be said for fear of injustice, since arriving in Hades with one’s soul riddled with wrongdoings is the ultimate evil.” pg 129
“He doesn’t know whose soul it is; in fact, he might well get hold of the soul of the king of Persia or some other king or potentate and notice that it’s riddled with defects—scourged and covered in the scars which ever dishonest and unjust action has imprinted on it, utterly crippled by lies and arrogance and warped by a truth-free diet—and he’d also see that the promiscuity, sensuality, brutality, and self-indulgence of his behaviour has thoroughly distorted the harmony and beauty of his soul.” pg 131
“…when Rhadamanthys gets hold of someone like that, he doesn’t even know his name or his background; all he knows is that he’s a bad man.” pg 133
Callicles’ argument:
Socrates is wrong and uses words to confuse people into believing anything he says.
“…where I think Polus was at fault was in agreeing with you that doing wrong is more contemptible than suffering wrong. It was this admission of his which enabled you to tie him up in logical knots and muzzle him…” pg 65
“I don’t know how you do it, Socrates, but you twist every single one of our arguments until it’s back to front.”
My own comments:
I did not like this particular reading. Callicles does not seem to be raising any real argument, merely attempting to discredit Socrates. Socrates in return seems to be antagonizing Callicles by using points raised in the discussion he began with Gorgias and continued with Polus to continue the argument that ended his conversation with Polus: that it is better to suffer harm than to cause harm to others. That having been said, it seems that we could have done without this final section entirely. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Plato used this last section to allow Socrates to make a point with which Plato agreed, and seemingly which Plato considered extremely important. He could probably have achieved this by cutting out the lines by Callicles altogether.
Socrates is right, and it is better to suffer wrong than to wrong someone else.
“Pay attention. then, as they say. It’s an excellent explanation. I expect you’ll think that what I’m about to tell you is just a story, but to my mind it does explain things, since it is, as far as I’m concerned, the truth.” pg129
“It’s completely irrational, and a sign of sheer cowardice, to fear the mere fact of death, but the same cannot be said for fear of injustice, since arriving in Hades with one’s soul riddled with wrongdoings is the ultimate evil.” pg 129
“He doesn’t know whose soul it is; in fact, he might well get hold of the soul of the king of Persia or some other king or potentate and notice that it’s riddled with defects—scourged and covered in the scars which ever dishonest and unjust action has imprinted on it, utterly crippled by lies and arrogance and warped by a truth-free diet—and he’d also see that the promiscuity, sensuality, brutality, and self-indulgence of his behaviour has thoroughly distorted the harmony and beauty of his soul.” pg 131
“…when Rhadamanthys gets hold of someone like that, he doesn’t even know his name or his background; all he knows is that he’s a bad man.” pg 133
Callicles’ argument:
Socrates is wrong and uses words to confuse people into believing anything he says.
“…where I think Polus was at fault was in agreeing with you that doing wrong is more contemptible than suffering wrong. It was this admission of his which enabled you to tie him up in logical knots and muzzle him…” pg 65
“I don’t know how you do it, Socrates, but you twist every single one of our arguments until it’s back to front.”
My own comments:
I did not like this particular reading. Callicles does not seem to be raising any real argument, merely attempting to discredit Socrates. Socrates in return seems to be antagonizing Callicles by using points raised in the discussion he began with Gorgias and continued with Polus to continue the argument that ended his conversation with Polus: that it is better to suffer harm than to cause harm to others. That having been said, it seems that we could have done without this final section entirely. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Plato used this last section to allow Socrates to make a point with which Plato agreed, and seemingly which Plato considered extremely important. He could probably have achieved this by cutting out the lines by Callicles altogether.
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
First Reading from Gorgias
Here is some discussion of the first reading from Gorgias.
Socrates’ argument against Gorgias:
"When there’s a public meeting in Athens to elect a doctor or a shipwright or any other professional, the purpose of the meeting is obviously to choose the person with the greatest expertise for each post, so it’s not going to be a rhetorician who advises then under these circumstances, is it? They’re not going to use rhetoricians to advise them when there are fortifications to be built or harbours or dockyards to be constructed: they’ll use master builders.”
Gorgias’ argument against Socrates:
“You don’t know the half of it, Socrates! Almost every accomplishment falls within the scope of rhetoric. I’ve for good evidence of this. Often in the past, when I’ve gone with my brother or some other doctor to one of their patients who was refusing to take his medicine or to let the doctor operate on him or cauterize him, the doctor proved incapable of persuading the patient to accept his treatment, but I succeeded, even though I didn’t have any other expertise to draw on except rhetoric.”
My comments:
Socrates bases his entire discussion with Gorgias on the question of relevance of rhetoric. This passage describes this lack of understanding well. Socrates is asking how necessary rhetoric can be when there seems to be no expertise involved in regards to situations in which expertise is of great use. In response, Gorgias claims that the relevance of rhetoric is made obvious when those with the expertise are unable to convince people of their opinions, a task easily accomplished by those well versed in rhetoric.
Socrates’ argument against Polus:
“Well, in my opinion, it doesn’t involve expertise; all you need is a mind which is good at guessing, some courage, and a natural talent for interacting, with people. The general term I use to refer to it is ‘flattery’, and this strikes me as a multi-faceted activity, one of whose branches is cookery. And what I’m saying about cookery is that it does seem to be a branch of expertise, but in fact isn’t; it’s a knack, acquired by habituation.”
Polus’ argument against Socrates:
“Rhetoricians are the most powerful members of their communities, aren’t they? Don’t they resemble dictators in that they can execute anyone they want, and confiscate a person’s property and then banish that person from their community if it seems best? As if you wouldn’t prefer to be able to do whatever you felt like doing in your community rather than the opposite, Socrates! You make it sound as though the sight of someone executing people when he thinks it’s best, or confiscating their property, or throwing them into prison, doesn’t make you envious.”
My comments:
Once again Socrates is questioning the idea of rhetoric involving expertise. Socrates claims that rhetoric is instead about making people feel good (flattery) about the issues of which you are trying to persuade them, thus encouraging them to go along with your ways of thinking. Polus replies with the claim that the ability to convince anyone of anything makes rhetoricians more powerful than any other professional.
Socrates’ argument against Gorgias:
"When there’s a public meeting in Athens to elect a doctor or a shipwright or any other professional, the purpose of the meeting is obviously to choose the person with the greatest expertise for each post, so it’s not going to be a rhetorician who advises then under these circumstances, is it? They’re not going to use rhetoricians to advise them when there are fortifications to be built or harbours or dockyards to be constructed: they’ll use master builders.”
Gorgias’ argument against Socrates:
“You don’t know the half of it, Socrates! Almost every accomplishment falls within the scope of rhetoric. I’ve for good evidence of this. Often in the past, when I’ve gone with my brother or some other doctor to one of their patients who was refusing to take his medicine or to let the doctor operate on him or cauterize him, the doctor proved incapable of persuading the patient to accept his treatment, but I succeeded, even though I didn’t have any other expertise to draw on except rhetoric.”
My comments:
Socrates bases his entire discussion with Gorgias on the question of relevance of rhetoric. This passage describes this lack of understanding well. Socrates is asking how necessary rhetoric can be when there seems to be no expertise involved in regards to situations in which expertise is of great use. In response, Gorgias claims that the relevance of rhetoric is made obvious when those with the expertise are unable to convince people of their opinions, a task easily accomplished by those well versed in rhetoric.
Socrates’ argument against Polus:
“Well, in my opinion, it doesn’t involve expertise; all you need is a mind which is good at guessing, some courage, and a natural talent for interacting, with people. The general term I use to refer to it is ‘flattery’, and this strikes me as a multi-faceted activity, one of whose branches is cookery. And what I’m saying about cookery is that it does seem to be a branch of expertise, but in fact isn’t; it’s a knack, acquired by habituation.”
Polus’ argument against Socrates:
“Rhetoricians are the most powerful members of their communities, aren’t they? Don’t they resemble dictators in that they can execute anyone they want, and confiscate a person’s property and then banish that person from their community if it seems best? As if you wouldn’t prefer to be able to do whatever you felt like doing in your community rather than the opposite, Socrates! You make it sound as though the sight of someone executing people when he thinks it’s best, or confiscating their property, or throwing them into prison, doesn’t make you envious.”
My comments:
Once again Socrates is questioning the idea of rhetoric involving expertise. Socrates claims that rhetoric is instead about making people feel good (flattery) about the issues of which you are trying to persuade them, thus encouraging them to go along with your ways of thinking. Polus replies with the claim that the ability to convince anyone of anything makes rhetoricians more powerful than any other professional.
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